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Executive Summary 
This research investigated a new approach to stimulate innovation in the 
acquisition, production and evolution of cybersecure modular OA software systems. 
These systems increasingly incorporate Web-based, mobile, or low-cost 
microelectronic devices. Systems of these kinds must combine best-of-breed 
software components subject to agile, adaptive requirements of multiple parties, 
while conforming to reusable software products lines. We seek to make this a 
simpler, more transparent, and more tractable process. Our recent and continuing 
line of research studies, publications and reports demonstrate how complex OA 
systems can be designed, built, and deployed with alternative components and 
connectors resulting in functionally similar system versions, to satisfy overall system 
capability requirements as well as individual OA system component intellectual 
property (IP) and cybersecurity requirements. These requirements are surfacing new 
challenges that can decrease (or increase) software acquisition costs.  
 Our next step addressed here was to initiate investigations the use of 
smart contracts and associated technologies (e.g., cryptocurrency, domain-
specific blockchain transaction languages and computational tools) for specifying 
shared agreements between multiple parties to acquisition efforts. We believe 
smart contracts can be computationally enacted during the design, integration, 
release, deployment, and evolution of cybersecure, modular open architecture 
software systems in ways that can model, track and analyze the associated 
contractual obligations and customer rights that drive costs and risks. Smart 
contracts incorporate computational specifications (i.e., computer programming 
script code) that enable formal and precise agreements between parties that can 
entail costing constraints, and production or cybersecurity requirements, that are 
associated with articulated OA system procurement obligations and rights. The 
associated technologies for smart contracts are emerging capabilities that enable 
computational protocols for tracking elemental transactions between multiple 
parties to a shared contractual agreement. Such agreements can arise, for 
example, when different commercial firms, non-profit enterprises, program 
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offices, and government agencies decide to share acquisition costs and risks in 
order to more rapidly assemble, produce, deliver, or evolve innovative 
cybersecure modular OA software systems. Our research results are 
documented in this Final Report. 
Last, our research results have been well received in presentations to 
different audiences, including academic and industry research groups, the larger 
Defense community, and the Federal Government more broadly. In particular, 
throughout 2017 our research results have been presented to audiences at the 
2017 Acquisition Research Symposium (Monterey, CA). Other project activities 
that produced material results include multiple presentations at the new 
Cybersecurity Policy & Research Institute based at the University of California, 
Irvine. These presentations have included senior level executives from more than 
80 industry and local government agencies, including law enforcement programs 
now burdened with investigating cybercrimes that entail covert entry, data 
exfiltration, and extortion based on legacy systems. As can been seen in these 
chapters, common and differentiated research results found in the chapters 
represent our efforts at reaching out to different audiences interested in our 
research, and what advice or guidance it may offer to such  audiences. 
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Research Overview 
Introduction 
The goal of this research was to investigate a new approach to stimulate 
innovation in the acquisition, production and evolution of cybersecure modular Open 
Architecture (OA) software systems [Kendall  2015]. We seek to make this a simpler, 
more transparent, and more tractable process. Our recent research demonstrates 
how complex OA systems can be designed, built, and deployed with alternative 
components and connectors resulting in functionally similar system versions, to 
satisfy overall system capability requirements as well as individual OA system 
component intellectual property (IP) and cybersecurity requirements [DoDGSA 2015, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2011,Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012, Scacchi and Alspaugh 
2013a, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b, 20]. These requirements are surfacing new 
challenges that can decrease (or increase) software acquisition costs [Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2014, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016].  
Our next step proposed here was to investigate the use of, and technical risks 
for, blockchains [2017], smart contracts [2017], and associated technologies. The 
associated technologies include distributed ledgers, cryptocurrency, domain-specific 
blockchain transaction languages and computational tools [Ethereum 2017]) for 
specifying shared agreements between multiple parties to acquisition efforts. We 
believe smart contracts can be computationally enacted during the design, 
integration, release, deployment, and evolution of cybersecure, modular open 
architecture software systems [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b, Scacchi and Alspaugh 
2015, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016] in ways that can model, track and analyze the 
associated contractual obligations and customer rights that drive costs and risks. 
Smart contracts incorporate computational specifications (i.e., computer 
programming script code) that enable formal and precise agreements between 
parties that can entail costing constraints, and production or cybersecurity 
requirements, that are associated with articulated OA system procurement 
obligations and rights. The associated technologies for smart contracts are emerging 
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capabilities that enable computational protocols for tracking elemental transactions 
between multiple parties to a shared contractual agreement. Such agreements can 
arise, for example, when different commercial firms, non-profit enterprises, program 
offices, and government agencies decide to share acquisition costs and risks in 
order to rapidly assemble, produce, deliver, or evolve innovative cybersecure 
modular OA software systems [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015,Scacchi and Alspaugh 
2016].  
Our efforts are also aligned to Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives [DoD 
2016, Kendall  2015] to: (a) use Modular Open Systems Architectures to stimulate 
innovation; (b) strengthen cybersecurity throughout the (software system) acquisition 
life cycle [DoDGSA 2015]; and (c) increase the use of (OA software system) 
prototyping and experimentation. Beyond this, our investigation into smart contracts 
and associated technologies could contribute to new ways or means to specify or 
review acquisition contract incentives as well as tracking and improving contract 
performance.  
Research Scope 
There is a significant need for sustained research that investigates the interplay 
and inter-relationships between (a) current/emerging guidelines for the acquisition of 
software-intensive systems (including contract management and software 
development issues), and (b) how secure, reusable software product lines [Guertin, 
Sweeney, Schmidt 2015, Mactal, Spruill 2012, Womble, Schmidt et al. 2011] that 
employ a modular, cybersecure OA incorporating OSS/CSS component products 
(e.g., widgets, apps, and mashups) and their production processes [Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2013b] are essential to stimulating innovation and improving the cost-
reduction effectiveness of software system acquisition efforts. 
Our acquisition research efforts are related to and primarily aligned with BBP 
initiatives that (a) use Modular Open Systems Architectures to stimulate innovation; 
(b) strengthen cybersecurity throughout the (software system) product life cycle; and 
(c) increase the use of (OA software system) prototyping and experimentation. As an 
example,  
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 “BBP 3.0 continues the emphasis on open systems architectures 
and modularity, focusing on providing technical enablers and tools 
that can be employed by the acquisition workforce and industry to 
enhance technology insertion, particularly in the most rapidly 
advancing areas of commercial technology  (e.g. microelectronics, 
sensors, and software)...Such approaches should be considered 
for enabling competition for upgrades, facilitating reuse across the 
joint force, easing technology insertion, and aiding adoption of 
incrementally upgraded software” (emphasis added) [Kendall 
2015].  
Our research efforts address such concerns through cybersecure modular OA 
software systems that adhere to five principles: (a) Establish an agile, adaptive 
ecosystem environment for software component/system development and 
deployment; (b) Employ modular OA software system design and reference 
architectures that accommodate reuse of bespoke, licensed, or legacy software 
components; (c) Designate open interfaces for bespoke, licensed, or legacy 
OSS/CSS system components or subsystems; (d) Use open standards; and (e) 
Certify conformance to contractual, cybersecurity, and intellectual property 
requirements and customer rights. Research that advances the acquisition, 
production, and evolution of cybersecure modular OA software systems—especially 
those incorporating Web-based, mobile, or smart IoT devices—that follow these 
principles is highly relevant to for-profit industries and non-profit organizations, as 
well as to DoD and other government agencies. 
Through our research, we seek to identify, track, and analyze acquisition 
costs, and development practices, for Web-based OA systems, mobile and 
emerging smart microelectronic IoT devices for use in enterprise software system 
applications. Such systems commonly integrate components independently 
developed by software producers using OSS or CSS, which then may be 
integrated into complete systems by system integrators [George, Morris, and 
O'Neil 2014, Reed, Benito, et al. 2012, Reed, Nankervis 2014,  Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2014]. Program managers, acquisition officers, and contract managers 
will increasingly be called on to review and approve cybersecurity measures 
employed during the design, integration, deployment, and evolution of OA 
systems [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013c].  
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Our research effort focused on performance of four concurrent research 
tasks. We briefly describe each research task then follow with an elaboration of 
our research description and the acquisition research questions we address. 
We seek to identify, track, and analyze ways and means for how to articulate, 
tailor, and streamline the process for diverse acquisition scenarios for cybersecure 
modular OA software systems that accommodate Web-based, mobile, and smart IoT 
devices running software widgets, apps, and mashups. We seek to do so in ways 
that focus on software cost drivers and that highlight smart contracting opportunities 
for stimulating innovation that can realize cost reduction through modular 
cybersecure OA software components or system configurations. This investigation is 
therefore applicable to complex software elements used in many kinds of 
component-based OA software-intensive systems within government agencies, such 
as the DoD, as well as commercial firms and non-profit enterprises.   
Realizing our research objectives and answering our research questions 
entails that our investigation focused on four research tasks in our approach, 
described in the next sub-section below. However, we propose that these four tasks 
are most effectively and most efficiently engaged when performed concurrently, 
rather than sequentially, due to the emergent nature of the proposed research line of 
study. Such concurrency also enables us to take advantage of advances in scientific 
knowledge or technological innovations that may appear during the course of our 
research efforts and task performance.  
List of Research Tasks 
i) Investigate the interactions between blockchains, smart contracts, and 
associated technologies with software system acquisition guidelines and processes, 
and the cost consequences of alternative software system architectures 
incorporating different mixes of OSS and CSS widgets, apps, mashups, and IoT 
device components subject to shared acquisition agreements among multiple parties 
that seek to produce assembled capabilities for C3CB applications using 
cybersecure modular OA components and SPLs [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013a, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013c, Scacchi and Alspaugh 
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2015, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016]. This entails exploring the balance between 
development, verification, and validation of software licenses and cybersecurity 
rights during procurement contract enactment, as well as the software widget, app, 
mashup, and IoT device component/license costs, while managing the development 
and evolution of OA systems at design-time, build-time, release and run-time, and 
post-deployment system evolution. 
ii) Develop and/or refine formal foundations for establishing acquisition 
guidelines, blockchain and smart contracting practices that program managers can 
use in diverse acquisition scenarios for reduced cost software-intensive systems that 
rely on development and deployment of secure modular OA systems using OSS 
widgets, apps, mashups, and IoT devices, as well as SPL technology and processes 
[Scacchi and Alspaugh 2011, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012, Scacchi and Alspaugh 
2013a, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013c, Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2014, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016]. 
iii) Continue to develop concepts contributing to the emerging design of an 
automated approach supporting acquisition of cybersecure, modular OA software 
systems by (a) determining their conformance to acquisition guidelines/policies, 
contracts, and related license management issues, and (b) giving future acquisition 
workforce support and insights to properly review, approve, and manage the 
acquisition of complex systems that incorporate cost-sensitive acquisition of 
cybersecure OA systems composed from software widget/app or software-based IoT 
device components [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2011, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013a, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b, Scacchi and Alspaugh 
2013c, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2014, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015, Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2016]. 
iv) Document the investigation, foundations, and results of the research in: 
(a) a Technical Report delivered within 30 days of project completion to the 
Technical Point of Contact at NPS; (b) a research paper to be presented at the 
14th Annual Acquisition Research Conference, in Monterey, CA, May 2017; (c) a 
progress report with the OSD sponsor via a video teleconference or other 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 6 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
meetings at a time to be determined during the period of the award; and (d) 
related research venues and publications, including periodic progress reports. 
Relevance of Our Efforts to Acquisition Research and Practice  
Overall, through this research effort, we continue to seek to identify, track, 
and analyze ways and means for how to articulate, tailor, and streamline the 
process for diverse acquisition scenarios for secure OA systems through use of 
blockchains and smart contracts that accommodate OA system supply chains 
that deliver Web-based and mobile devices running widgets, apps, and mashups. 
We seek to do so in ways that focus on innovative opportunities emerging from 
the potential introduction of blockchains and smart contracts in OA system 
acquisition processes and ecosystems. This investigation is therefore applicable 
to complex software elements used in many kinds of component-based OA 
software-intensive systems within business and academic enterprises, other non-
governmental organizations, as well as DoD and other governmental 
organizations. Furthermore, through these four tasks, this acquisition research 
supports and advances a public purpose by investigating challenges arising from 
the adoption and deployment of, which is a broad audience for our research 
[Scacchi and Alspaugh 2014b, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2014c, Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2015, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2017a, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2017b].  
Finally, we note that academic institutions, government agencies, and 
most large-scale business enterprises continually seek new ways to improve the 
functional capabilities of their software- intensive systems through lower 
acquisition costs. The acquisition of OA systems that can adapt and evolve 
through replacement of functionally similar Web-based and mobile device-based 
software components and SPLs is an innovation that can lead to lower cost 
systems with more powerful, more agile functional capabilities. There is a 
significant need for sustained research that investigates the interplay and inter-
relationships between (a) current/emerging guidelines for the acquisition of 
software-intensive systems, and (b) how secure, reusable software product lines 
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[Mactal and Spruill 2012, Womble, Schmidt, Arendt, Fain 2011] that employ an 
OA incorporating OSS/CSS component products (e.g., widgets, apps, and 
mashups) and their production processes [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b], are 
essential to improving the buying power and cost-reduction effectiveness of 
software-intensive program acquisition efforts.  
OA system acquisition, development and deployment are thus an 
approach to realizing better buying outcomes for lowering system costs while 
jointly enabling more competition through the adoption of OA systems that utilize 
standardized interfaces, utilize OSS components where appropriate, increase 
small business roles and opportunities, use of technical development phase for 
true risk reduction and rapid prototyping, as well as doing more without more 
[Scacchi and Alspaugh 2014a, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015].  
Last, we are grateful for the support and funding we have received that 
enabled our acquisition research to continue, and as documented in this Final 
Report. We welcome any comments or questions regarding any materials or 
concepts presented in this Report. 
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Cybersecure Modular Open Architecture Software 
Systems for Stimulating Innovation 
How might we stimulate the development of innovative approaches to 
continuously assuring the cybersecurity of Open Architecture (OA) software system? 
This is the acquisition research challenge we are addressing. In particular, we are 
interesting in investigating innovations that represent either incremental 
improvements or substantial departures in current acquisition practice of such 
systems. We target our efforts to practical OA software system production, 
deployment and sustainment for applications like command and control, or business 
enterprise (C2/B) systems that are central to the mission and operations of military 
or industrial enterprises. So we seek to stimulate significant innovations that employ 
emerging concepts and technologies to problems observable with the acquisition, 
development, and evolution of modern C2/B systems.  
Our interest is to stimulate the development of innovative approaches to 
continuously assuring the cybersecurity of Open Architecture (OA) software system. 
We focus attention to exploring the potential for using blockchains and smart 
contract techniques, and how they can be applied to support acquisition efforts for 
software systems for OA command and control, or business enterprise (C2/B) 
systems. We further limit our focus to examining the routine software system 
updates to OA software configuration specifications that arise during the 
development and evolution processes arising during system acquisition. We find that 
there are new ways and means by which blockchains and smart contracts can be 
used to continuously assure the cybersecurity of software updates arising during OA 
software system development and evolution processes. We present a case study 
examining software evolution process that updates an OA C2/B system, to describe 
these details. We then discuss some consequences that follow for what emerges 
from these innovations in expanding the scope of cybersecurity assurance of not just 
the delivered OA C2/B software systems, but to the engineering processes which 
create, transform or otherwise update technical data that is central to the acquisition 
of OA software systems. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 10 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Problem 
The particular problem we investigate here is how best to develop and 
demonstrate a new conceptual approach to providing continuous cybersecurity 
assurance [cf. DoDGSA 2013] with OA C2/B software systems in response to 
evolutionary updates to currently installed software configurations that routinely arise 
during the technical development and maintenance, upkeep, and sustainment in the 
field—what we call, software evolution [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012, Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2017a]. 
Solution 
The innovation we focus our attention to are the concepts, techniques, and 
technologies that denote blockchains and smart contracts, along with how they can 
be used to continuously assure the cybersecurity of software updates arising during 
OA software system development and evolution processes that span software 
supply chains. 
Approach 
Our efforts focus on an innovative utilization of blockchains and smart 
contracts within the technical software development and evolution processes that 
arise within the acquisition of complex, OA C2/B software systems. We are not 
focusing attention at this time to software purchasing activities or financial 
transactions, though blockchains and smart contracts are likely to stimulate 
innovations in this aspect of OA software system acquisition. 
Why this approach? 
Based on prior studies of issues and challenges arising in the development 
and evolution of OA software systems for C2/B system applications [Guertin, 
Sweeney, Schmidt, 2015, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012-2017, Womble, Schmidt, 
Arendt, Fain 2011], we have already drawn attention to technical problems that arise 
in the software engineering processes that software producers, system integrators, 
and customer end-users (both enterprises and individuals therein) experience. But 
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we recognize these processes are partially-ordered sets of activities whose 
completion often entails technical data transactions like creation of digital system 
design documents, composition and integration of software components (e.g., 
applications, mobile apps, plug-in widgets), and deployed software 
executable/update packages that are stored, installed, and tracked in different online 
repositories across a network environment. At present, these transactions often lack 
a common or centralized repository for tracking these diverse transactions across 
networked platforms that span an OA software system ecosystem (a supply chain 
network from producers to system integrators to customer enterprises/individuals). 
We believe blockchains are a candidate for this. These transactions similarly lack a 
common and potentially reusable specification for how to manage and track such 
software engineering transactions in forms that are open to independent validation 
and audit. We believe smart contracts are a candidate to address this. 
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Background: Blockchains, Smart Contracts and 
Software Supply Chains 
Blockchains 
Blockchains are a 21st Century computational mechanism for realizing the 
equivalent of the traditional bookkeeping ledger utilized in finance and accounting. 
Such ledgers record and track the assignment of incoming (budget authorization or 
revenue) and outgoing (allocations and expenses) enterprise transactions and 
denominated amounts, whether in a monetary currency, bartered trade, or some 
other transactional resource (e.g., gold bullion, Bitcoins, original artworks) [DuPont 
and Maurer 2015]. Such transactions are grouped in blocks, for example a set of 
interrelated OA software system updates may be grouped together into a block that 
denotes a transformation of the current system configuration into an evolved system 
configuration.  
Figure 1 shows a model for what a small blockchain may look like if visualized 
as a chain-like structure.  
 
Figure 1. Visual model of a simple blockchain, highlighting individual update transaction blocks 
(squares), as well as the longest path of validated update transactions. Transaction blocks not on the 
longest path are considered as no-longer-valid elements of the blockchain. 
Both transactions and blocks are serialized, logged, timestamped, and 
tracked in ways that are open to internal, external or independent verification and 
audit by decentralized third-parties [Blockchain 2017]. Updates to the blockchain are 
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allowed only by consensus of remote mechanisms and proofs of work by 
anonymous, untrusted service providers (called miners) who collect a modest 
execution fee for their efforts. The payment and deposit of an execution fee also 
mitigates against the actions of unknown others who might act to corrupt the 
blockchain state. Finally, blockchains can be realized as persistent databases or 
cloud-based repositories [Blockchain 2017]. Such repositories might be utilized, for 
example, to record and store a bill of materials detailing all software elements that 
are composed into a specified software system configuration, as well as the itemized 
serialization of the evolutionary updates to any of the software elements therein, 
across the development and maintenance life cycle of an OA software system [cf. 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2017a]. Figure 2 displays a traditional centralized ledger 
versus a decentralized blockchain ledger. 
 
 
Figure 2: Traditional ledger network on left, decentralized blockchain ledger network on right. 
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Blockchains operate as an append-only data structure or database 
maintained by a decentralized collection of mutually distrusting computational nodes 
participating in a peer-to-peer network. Blockchains are secure by design 
[Blockchain 2017]. Blockchain ledgers are updated (appended) as a result of 
recorded transactions, much like a personal bank account is updated through 
deposit, withdrawal, credit or debit transactions made by the account holder, through 
a third-party (the bank or transaction system processor), who may charge a fee for 
transactions. Much like bank account transactions, blockchain update transactions 
are distributed over a network, time-stamped, persistent, and verifiable. However, 
the peer-to-peer network of blockchain nodes is a decentralized autonomous 
authority without legal standing, compared to the centralized authority taken by a 
bank or credit/debit card transaction processor.  
Smart Contracts 
Smart contracts denote the computational counterparts of traditional paper 
contracts for how a group of interrelated transactions will be governed to assure 
fulfillment of terms, conditions, rights and obligations. Within distributed ledger 
applications and blockchain associated technologies, smart contracts are denoted 
by software programs that can be automatically executed whenever blockchain 
transactions occur. Such transactions, for example, may be associated with the 
acquisition of a complex system or with the ongoing procurement of retail supply 
purchasing agreements. These smart contracts denote networked software system 
protocols that facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of a 
specified contract, and thus which transactions to process (where, when, how, and 
for what parties) in what order [Smart Contracts 2017]. They are realized using 
computer based, formal specifications of transaction-based processes that can be 
codified into executable computer programs. Such computational support allows for 
modeling, analysis and simulation of transactions or processes that can be enacted, 
verified and validated at Internet-time speeds, with precision and automated recall of 
transaction details well beyond what enterprises traditionally have performed. Smart 
contracts also allow for the establishment and operation of decentralized 
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autonomous services that allow for cooperating parties to enact and fulfill the details 
of a shared contract through just automated means. Next, smart contracts are 
automatically enforced by the consensus mechanism associated with the 
blockchain. Smart contracts are thus attractive to use to securely manage recurring 
transactions between known or unknown parties, such as those associated with 
updating the technical data, source code, repositories, and related artifacts 
associated with software development and evolution processes associated with 
large, long-term software acquisition efforts.  
Software Supply Chains and Ecosystems 
Software elements and configured system are developed by component or 
system producers on the way to being adopted and deployed by customer 
organizations or end-users. Many times, the software elements are subjected to 
value-added system integration efforts which expand the scope and functional 
capabilities of the resulting integrated system for deployment, or may otherwise 
integrate these elements within legacy installed software systems. This ecosystem 
of producers, system integrators, and customers form a network of relationships that 
is commonly called a software supply network. Such a network may offer many 
possible pathways that enable the flow of newly produced or integrated software 
elements (e.g., new software products, apps, or widgets) in particular configurations 
that are targeted to a specific type of software deployment platform, installation or 
ecosystem niche [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012]. Such a path from producers through 
integrators to customers denotes a specific software supply chain. A generalized 
abstract depiction of a software ecosystem as a software supply network is shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 17 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Figure 3. Software supply chain development processes [Al Sabbagh & Kowalski 2015]. 
 
Figure 4. An ecosystem model of a software supply network connecting software producers, system 
integrators and consumers (customers/end-users) [cf. Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012, Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2017a]. 
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A small number of software supply chain researchers has sought to develop 
models for software supply chains that can be visually rendered to aid in facilitating 
understanding and communication. For example, researchers at the Software 
Engineering Institute have sought to visualize software supply chains as directed 
graphs [Ellison, et al 2010]. But such a model may somewhat obscure how software 
elements move through a development process life cycle, especially when iterative 
development processes are employed. Alternatively, others like Al Sabbagh & 
Kowalski [2015] draw attention to explicit development process flows, as shown in 
Figure 3. Such a representation can also incorporate annotations for denoting where 
different kinds of social or technical risks to the integrity of the software supply chain 
may arise, which provides both foundational and practical insights to which 
processes maybe subject to different types of cybersecurity threats. Unfortunately, 
such a process-centered rendering slights inter-relationships between different 
participating producers, system integrators and customers.  
Our view of a software ecosystem seeks to combine or unify these alternative 
approaches to modeling and visualizing software supply chains, as have appeared 
in our earlier efforts [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2017a]. However, we note that at this point we do not have a 
single visual representation that combines a software supply network and process 
flow into a single rendering that may be complex and thus obscure, but instead rely 
on multiple visualizations, one for the supply network, and others for OA software 
configurations that result from different software development or evolution 
processes. Said more simply, consider integrating the view from Figure 3 in place of 
the “Architecture for Integrated Component or Application” box in the following 
Figure 4. That is, one or more OA software system “Integrators” routinely enact 
software supply chain development processes [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2017a].  
The software ecosystem schema in Figure 4 represents the ecosystem 
immediately connected to a particular component/application integrator. It is 
recursive: a “producer” in the top row of the figure can itself be a software 
ecosystem, determined by its own architecture and supplied by its own producers, 
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for which the consumer is the architecture and integrator of the larger schema’s 
product, and a “consumer” in the bottom row may be a software ecosystem for a 
further component/application. The basic steps of the recursion in each direction are 
(i) a consumer who is a user only, and (ii) a producer of a simple component, one 
that is developed from scratch and makes use of no subcomponents. A typical large 
OA system will contain a number of such simple components that act as shims or 
scripts between larger components with related but nonidentical interfaces. 
Blockchains are being extended to accommodate smart contracts that allow 
for the formation of virtual, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) 
[Ethereum 2017] that can span diverse software ecosystems of different size, 
connectivity, and complexity.  DAO in turn can be designed to govern, enforce, and 
assure the integrity and validity of complex or idiosyncratic blockchain update 
transactions on supply chains of different types [Smart Contracts 2017]. In our case, 
a software supply chain delivers software elements or systems through a DAO that 
denotes a given configuration of participating software producers, system integrators 
and customer organizations.  
Our interest is focused on software supply chains that enable continuous flow 
of developmental or evolutionary updates to software elements configured to 
operate within an OA software system. In one acquisition scenario, this might entail 
the procurement of pre-certified and secured software apps from a secured, online 
app/component store [George, Galdorisi, et al. 2014, George, Morris, et al. 2014].  
Alternatively, multiple independent Program Offices or independent enterprises may 
seek to partner with other parties to share the cost of developing bespoke OA 
software system apps or components. Figure 5 presents a notional depiction of two 
alternative acquisition scenarios. Overall, multi-party agreements for coordinated 
system acquisition can denote a kind of DAO whereby two or more Program Offices 
or other enterprises can act to shared the procurement costs of a new C2/B system 
application or component, of mutual interest to the participating parties [cf. Reed, 
Benito, Collens, Stein, 2012, Reed, Nankervis, Cochran, Parekh, Stein, 2014, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015].  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 20 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Figure 5. Notional depiction of two alternative scenarios entailing “mobile reciprocity” or “multi-
party interactions” for  acquisition of OA software system components, applications or integrated 
system capabilities [Reed, Benito, Collens, Stein, 2012, Reed, Nankervis, Cochran, Parekh, 
Stein, 2014, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015]. 
No single participating Program Office or acquisition enterprise necessarily is 
“in charge” of the overall shared acquisition, so all parties participate on the basis of 
their ability or resources they contribute to realize the shared goal of a particular 
DAO. Similarly, smart contracts can govern transactions between mutually 
distrusting participants that are automatically enforced by automated consensus 
mechanisms associated with blockchain updates. This capability thus provides a 
mechanism for detecting, rejecting or preventing unauthorized update transactions 
to the blockchain, as might be attempted via a cyber attack during OA software 
system development or evolution. Accordingly, our interest is to investigate how 
blockchains, smart contracts and related technologies can be utilized to improve 
cybersecurity, specifically to manage and track software engineering development 
and evolution processes that entail process transactions that update the 
configuration of OA software systems. 
So how might we utilize blockchains and smart contracts to innovate the 
continuous development and evolution of OA systems? How can this be conceived 
and applied in ways that are not specifically limited to financial transactions 
commonly associated with system acquisition? Before we can answer such 
questions, we need to more closely examine what kinds of cybersecurity threats to 
software supply chains we want to defend against using blockchains and more.  
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Social, Technical, and Unintentional Cybersecurity 
Threats to Software Supply Chains  
Recent Cybersecurity Attacks on Software Supply Chains 
Coordinated international attacks on vulnerable software-intensive systems of 
high value and controlling complex systems are becoming ever more apparent. 
Security threats to software systems are multi-valent, multi-modal, and distributed 
across independently developed software system components. Five recent attacks 
illustrate these characteristics, and also a progression from attacks against systems, 
to attacks against ecosystems that result in compromised systems developed in 
those ecosystems, to attacks against tools used in multiple ecosystems that result in 
compromised systems developed in any of those ecosystems. Consider the 
following recent events that demonstrate different ways and means through which 
software supply chains have become vulnerable to cybersecurity attacks. 
Stuxnet: malicious code distributed via physical storage devices across a 
virtual software supply chain 
Stuxnet [Falliere, Murchu, Chien 2011] was a well planned attack of 
cyberphysical systems used to control industrial system operations, including those 
associated with nuclear materials processing. Stuxnet was discovered in July 2010, 
but subsequent analysis indicated that thousands of industrial control system 
software worldwide were eventually infected and subject to cybersecurity attacks 
that utilized vulnerabilities exploited by Stuxnet. Stuxnet is thus a significant example 
of a successful attack on an poorly perceived software supply chain—the virtual 
network of mostly unconnected computers running the targeted software systems 
(e.g., Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) software package). The 
coordinated Stuxnet attack employed a bundle of attack/viral vectors and social 
engineering tactics in order for the attack to reach strategic industrial control 
systems that were isolated and walled off (“air gapped”) from public computer 
networks. The Stuxnet attack entered through software system interfaces at either 
the component, application subsystem, or base operating system level (e.g., via 
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removable thumb drive storage devices), and its goal was to go outside or beneath 
its entry context. Furthermore, the Stuxnet attack involved the use of corrupted 
“certificates of trust” from approved authorities as false credentials that allowed 
evolutionary system updates to go forward. 
NotPetya: malicious code distributed through access to producer source code  
NotPetya, discovered in June 2017, used the Ukrainian tax accounting 
software M.E.Doc as an infection vector. Once installed, it attempts to propagate 
across a network using any of four different exploits. It collects usernames, 
passwords, and other confidential information and installs a backdoor giving the 
attackers control of the machine. If commanded by the attackers, it destructively 
encrypts files and, if administrator privileges are obtained, the master boot record, 
rendering the files irretrievable and the computer unusable; this part of the attack 
masquerades as ransomware but victims who pay ransom apparently do so 
fruitlessly. The attackers injected a backdoor into a legitimate M.E.Doc module, 
presumably with access to the source code; the compromised class methods were 
then invoked when the software checked for updates [Cherepanov 2017, US-CERT 
2017].  
CCleaner: attack performed upstream of cryptographic signature and 
distribution  
A version of the widely-used and free CCleaner utility that was downloaded in 
August and September 2017 was found to contain a backdoor with remote system 
administration tools. The malware was piggybacked on valid CCleaner releases on 
legitimate download servers, and cryptographically signed with a valid certificate 
issued to Piriform, CCleaner’s producer. It appears that attackers gained access to 
at least part of the CCleaner development or build environment [Brumaghin, Gibb, et 
al. 2017, Menn 2017].  
XCodeGhost: infected developer tools infect software they create  
In late 2015, a fake version of Apple’s XCode development tools was placed 
on unofficial sites for Chinese developers. The fake XCode tools injected 
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XCodeGhost malware into apps developed using them, thus infecting supply chains 
of software to which the attackers need not have access [Greenberg 2017]. 
Equifax: through a bug in widely used open source software component, 
inserting persistent attack software and remote control of enterprise systems, 
enabling prolonged systematic data exfiltration 
In Spring 2017, Equifax, one of the three leading credit-reporting firms in the 
U.S. was exposed to a remote attack through a known technical vulnerability in its 
backbone software infrastructure (e.g., Apache Struts). As knowledge of the Struts 
vulnerability and its software update repair was publicly disclosed, it was clear that 
resolving this problem requires a concerted software update effort in any 
organizational or infrastructural system configuration where it was installed. A 
simple, pre-coded software patch was not available, nor was it appropriate, due to 
the configurable data processing capabilities that Struts provides. While the social 
and technical details of the Equifax breach are described in greater detail elsewhere 
[Riley, Robertson, Sharpe 2017], it also appears that the attack was prolonged due 
to unintentional conditions and events arising from contractual disputes between 
Equifax and its third-party cybersecurity service provider regarding the efficacy of 
contracted service performance. As a consequence of the threats and unintentional 
conditions, the attack persisted for months, and that dozens if not more unauthorized 
software updates to installed software configurations on different Equifax enterprise 
systems were propagated across Equifax networks and multiple databases. 
Remotely controlled system and data analysis tools were covertly installed that could 
query accessible data assets to reveal their contents, as well as install other 
secondary software tools that could covertly extract and encrypt appropriated data, 
then disseminate gigabytes of acquired data over public networks over 
combinatorially diverse paths (e.g., darknet torrents) to hidden/masked destinations 
in other countries. The scale, sophistication, and continued covert software 
installation suggests a state-sponsored attack enterprise utilizing multi-mode entry 
and attack vectors, much like Stuxnet, rather than an individual or simple criminal 
endeavor [Riley, Robertson, Sharpe 2017]. 
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Social and Technical Threats to OA Software Supply Chains 
More generally, cybersecurity threat categories can be identified starting from 
an interpretation of Wang et al. (2013) that is augmented with other constructs or 
concepts from secure open architecture software systems found in papers by 
Scacchi and Alspaugh [2008-2017]. The security threat meta-model identified below 
is grouped into three sections, each beginning on a new page for clarity. This is 
followed by diagrams and excerpts from the threat model by Wang et al. [2013]. The 
social threats and technical threats from Wang et al. have been modified and 
expanded to accommodate our concepts, and thus serve as a basis for developing a 
security threat meta-model for open architecture software systems. What is needed 
is an articulation of a security threat meta-model that incorporates concepts, 
constructs, tools, and capabilities derived from blockchains, smart contracts, 
software taggants, and smarter contracts (smart contracts that stipulate enactable 
software security license obligations and rights).  
Following Al Sabbagh and Kowalski (2015), software security 
countermeasures need to address, for example, social threats when recipients of a 
software product deny receiving it, a social countermeasure would be to legally 
require a third-party notary (e.g., blockchain miner) to prove that recipients actually 
received the software product (i.e., verification and non-repudiation of update 
transaction). A technical countermeasure to deal with the same threat would be the 
implementation of digital signatures using public-key cryptography (cf. software 
taggants [Kennedy and Muttik 2011]). Another example of using counter-measures 
is thwarting the threat of malicious code being injected into source code while 
transmitted over the network. A social countermeasure would be implementation of a 
third-party escrow (via blockchain), where a technical countermeasure would be 
implementation of virtual private networks (blockchains). In future research effort, we 
envision cybersecurity countermeasures (can be formally specifically) using OA 
software system security licenses that are computationally enacted through smart 
contracts that stipulate defensive, detective, or preventive cybersecurity 
countermeasures. 
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We provide an expanded and revised list of 30 social threats and 24 technical 
threats informed by similar lists presented in Wang, Al Sabbagh, and Kowalski 
(2013). 
Social Threats to Software Supply Chains 
ST1: Supplier of software product denies having sent the software product.  
ST2: Ordered software products such as outsourced software components could not 
arrive on time because of non-technical reasons such as delivery mistake.  
ST3: Secret information (ex. hard-coded key, seed value) about the outsourced 
software component is disclosed unintentionally by internal employee. 
ST4: Like ST3, but intentionally because of bribery or some other reason. 
ST5: Unauthorized people get access to the secret information of outsourced 
software component through non-technical reasons such as spoofing.  
ST6: Security weakness information about the sourced software product is disclosed 
unintentionally by internal employee to unauthorized people. 
ST7: Like ST6, but intentionally. 
ST8: Unauthorized people get access to the security weakness information of 
outsourced software component through non-technical reasons such as spoofing.  
ST9: Secret information (ex. hard-coded key, seed value) about the software product 
is disclosed unintentionally by internal employee to unauthorized people. 
ST10: Like ST9, but intentionally.  
ST11: Unauthorized people get access to the secret information of the software 
product through non-technical reasons such as spoofing.  
ST12: Security weakness information about the software product is disclosed 
unintentionally by internal employee to unauthorized people. 
ST13: Like ST12, but intentionally. 
ST14: Unauthorized people get access to the security weakness information through 
non-technical reasons such as spoofing.  
ST15: Source code or installation package is destroyed unintentionally by internal 
employee for authorized people. 
ST16: Like ST15, but intentionally. 
ST17: Malicious code is inserted into the source code or installation package 
unintentionally by internal employee.  
ST18: Like ST17, but intentionally by unauthorized people. 
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ST19: Unauthorized people get access to the source code or installation package, 
modify it or destroy it (NB: “evolution update transactions”) through non-technical 
reasons such as spoofing.  
ST20: (Un)authorized people can/cannot get access to the source code or 
installation package because of non-technical reasons such as flooding.  
ST21: Data storage facility for source code or installation package becomes 
unavailable to Unauthorized people because of non-technical reasons such as 
flooding.  
ST22: User guide of the software product is modified or deleted (NB: “evolution 
update transactions”) unintentionally by internal employee.  
ST23: Like ST22, but intentionally. 
ST24: Unauthorized people get access to the user guide of the software product, 
modify it or destroy it (i.e., these are unauthorized OA software “evolution update 
transactions”) through non-technical reasons such as spoofing.  
ST25: Cannot get access to the user guide of the software product because of non-
technical reasons such as flooding.  
ST26: Data storage facility for user guide becomes unavailable because of non-
technical reasons such as flooding.  
ST27: Real software products are replaced by counterfeit (NB: “evolution update 
transactions”)  
ST28: Recipient (customer or staff working in the delivery process) denies the 
receipt of the software product.  
ST29: Internal employee destroys data media unintentionally.  
ST30: Security mechanism (ex. length of the key) deployed within the software 
product is not allowed by the applicable law of the end-customer.  
Technical Threats to Software Supply Chains 
TT1: Malicious code is inserted into open source tool by unauthorized people 
through technical approach, which leads to security defects of the software product.  
TT2: Secret information (ex. hard-coded key, seed value) about the outsourced 
software component is obtained by unauthorized people through technical approach 
such as hacking.  
TT3: Unauthorized people get access to the security weakness information of 
outsourced software component through technical approach such as hacking.  
TT4: Unauthorized people insert malicious code into the outsourced software 
component while it is in storage using technical approach such as hacking.  
TT5: Malicious code is inserted into the outsourced software component by 
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unauthorized people during delivery through technical approach.  
TT6: Outsourced software component is destroyed by unauthorized people through 
technical approach such as attacking the storage facility.  
TT7: Unauthorized people get access to the security weakness information of the 
software product through technical approach such as hacking.  
TT8: Secret information (ex. hard-coded key, seed value) about the software product 
is obtained by unauthorized people using technical approach such as hacking.  
TT9: Malicious code is inserted by unauthorized people into the source code or 
installation package when it is in storage through technical approach such as 
hacking.  
TT10: Malicious code is inserted into source code or installation package when it is 
stored in the data media by unauthorized people during product delivery (physical 
delivery).  
TT11: Malicious code is inserted into source code or installation package of the 
software product during network transmission by unauthorized people through 
technical approach.  
TT12: Source code or installation package is destroyed by unauthorized people 
when it is in storage through technical approach.  
TT13: Source code or installation package is destroyed by unauthorized people 
during network transmission through technical approach.  
TT14: Network access to the source code or installation package is destroyed by 
attackers using technical approach such as DOS attack.  
TT15: Data media is destroyed by unauthorized people through technical approach.  
TT16: Unauthorized people get access to the user guide of the software product, 
and modified it intentionally through technical approach such as hacking. 
TT17: Unauthorized people get access to the user guide of the software product, 
delete it or modify it to make it unavailable through technical approach such as 
hacking.  
TT18: User guide of the software product is damaged or modified during network 
transmission through technical approach such as hacking during network 
transmission.  
TT19: User guide of the software product is modified through technical approach 
such as session hijacking attack during network transmission.  
TT20: Malicious code is inserted into patches by unauthorized people when it is in 
storage through technical approach such as hacking.  
TT21: Malicious code is inserted into patches during network transmission through 
technical approach such as hijacking by unauthorized people.  
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TT22: Patches are destroyed by unauthorized people when it is in storage through 
technical approach.  
TT23: Patches are destroyed by unauthorized people during network transmission 
through technical approach.  
TT24: Network access to the patches is destroyed by unauthorized people using 
technical approach such as DOS attack.  
Finally, Al Sabbagh and Kowalski [2015, Also see Wang, et al. 2013] provide 
a visual model that seeks to associate where cybersecurity threats such as those 
identified above may arise within different software development processes that 
span software supply chains. Their model is shown in Figure 6 below. 
Other Unintentional Socio-Technical Threats 
Both social threats and technical threats identified above are amenable to 
intervention, detection, or prevention via different kinds of cybersecurity mechanisms 
or practices. However, there are also other unintentional socio-technical threats that 
emerge through unexpected acts, conditions, or events identified as: mistakes, 
errors, breakdowns, accidents, glitches, anomalous events, system outages, system 
failures, system implementation failures, and the like. Such acts, conditions, or event 
can create externalities or effects that temporarily defeat, reset, or bypass 
cybersecurity system elements, configurations, or settings whose normal operation 
can provide effective cybersecurity protections or assurances. Here we identify 
examples of these threats. 
– Mistakes may arise, for example, in mis-entering the values for the 
configuration or update of configuration information used to assign security 
protections following a Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG).  
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Figure 6. Al Sabbagh and Kowalski [2015] model for associating selected social and technical 
threats identified earlier with software development processes spanning software supply chains. 
– Errors may arise due to omission, commission, or miscalculation with 
omission errors resulting from security values that are not entered or updated per 
guidelines (e.g., ignoring instructions to reset the default password, or entering an 
easily guessed very weak password). Errors of commission may denote those 
arising from inadequate training of proper system operating conditions and user-
system interactions (e.g., “I didn’t know I was suppose to do that” or “I didn’t read the 
manual”). Commission errors may also arise due to other forms of incompetent 
system use, or where software system designers assume system users have certain 
skills or think/act is certain ways regarding proper system use, which turns out not to 
be the case. Errors of miscalculation entail usage conditions where users mistype or 
mis-enter data, code, or formulae that otherwise look correct as plausible input, 
which in turn may give rise to downstream calculations or outputs that modify system 
data/operations, that in turn precipitate other unintentional conditions, events, or 
actions. 
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– Breakdowns can arise at any time when a workflow utilizes a software 
component or application that for some reason, does not operate as expected, 
freezes, “hangs” or suddenly stops and exits without warning, such that the 
status/state of the attendant work-in-progress in unclear, garbled, or lost. 
Breakdowns thus require some form or rework to recover from the breakdown. 
– Accidents can take many forms, but include matters such as blunt object 
falls/drops, or beverage/food/liquid spills, on computer keyboards or desktop 
peripherals (e.g., removable disk drives) which may introduce electrical short circuits 
that are misinterpreted by the computer as a user input or command sequence 
invocation, that in turn may undo or bypass currently active security system 
elements. 
– Glitches are peculiar system behaviors that often denote hidden/latent 
computational concurrencies that give rise to conditions like deadlocks, mutual 
exclusion race conditions, infinite loops, memory leaks or spillover effects. Rectifying 
such glitches often entails activities like restarting or shutdown-and-startup the 
computer system, but without any knowledge of whether any security elements were 
altered or unintentionally reconfigured by the glitch, and thus potentially 
bypassed/disabled after the restart or reboot. 
– Anomalous events or conditions are unpredictable, unrepeatable, and 
sometimes unrecognizable. This is what makes them anomalous! Their direct or 
indirect effects on software or security elements are determined only in hindsight, or 
after repeated occurrence, in which case they are no longer anomalous. When 
software or security system elements are configured to operate in a highly reliable 
manner, then anomalous conditions are often ignored through use of system 
breakpoints that are logged and recoverable back to last known point of reliable 
operation via fast reboot or redundant coprocessors. 
– System outages denote periods of time when an enterprise software system 
in unavailable for routine use online (cf. authorized users denied system access for 
lack of availability). Outages may be scheduled and notified in advance (e.g., for 
hardware repairs or planned system upgrades), in which case they should not give 
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rise to unintentional vulnerabilities. However, outages may arise unexpectedly for 
reasons not visible to remote API or system users. Any of the unintentional 
conditions or events listed here can give rise to unplanned system outages, as may 
other sources of unreliable system operations. Generally, outages can be mitigated 
through provision of hot-swap backup or redundant system configurations, but these 
come at a cost. The ongoing profitability or revenue-positive condition of the 
enterprise may determine whether or not outages are mitigated through redundant 
system configurations. 
– System failures can arise due to the emergence of any of the preceding 
kinds of unintentional events or conditions that disrupt enterprise operations at an 
individual, group, or business unit level [Loscocco, Smaller, et al. 1998]. These 
failures generally require some form of human or organizational intervention, as well 
as replanning and rescheduling of work in progress, as well as assessing whether or 
how to recover system managed work products that were unintentionally modified or 
corrupted as a result of the system failure. Systems failures can trigger 
consequences like bypassing or resetting system security protections or capabilities 
back to an earlier version that has already been updated and replaced, thus 
potentially re-exposing known software vulnerabilities. 
– System implementation failures denote the failure of an enterprise to 
completely and properly install and transition to a new software system (or major 
system version release). Implementation problems are commonly manifest over 
longer periods of time, sometimes ranging from weeks to months or years. System 
brought online or into production (or even pre-production) prior to implementation 
completion may be configured to operate with/without extant enterprise 
cybersecurity capabilities, policies, or methods in place and operational. 
Vulnerabilities in such system configurations may allow attackers to covertly enter 
the system perimeter and to hide/bury itself for an indefinite period until awoken by 
remote control or system clock. While the inadequately implemented system itself 
may be vulnerable, it may also simply be exploited as a covert gateway to other 
enterprise systems of interest to attackers.  
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Other unintentional socio-technical events, conditions, or acts may be 
identified, as may their consequences for altering, corrupting, or unknowingly 
reconfigured cybersecurity system elements, capabilities, or methods. 
Overall, it is clear that unintentional socio-technical threats are recurring, 
inherently difficult to prevent, and entail human-computer activities that are 
commonly undocumented, not taught, and thus persist. Accordingly, managing 
unintentional threats will always require vigilant practice by software system users, 
maintainers, and administrators, as cybersecurity system capabilities and methods 
cannot in general overcome these limitations. 
Countermeasures for Mitigating Cybersecurity Threats 
Software systems security mechanisms for implementing security 
requirements and policies are often employed on an ad hoc basis rather than in a 
scalable, organized, and effective manner. Convenient, interactive approaches 
supported by automated evaluation and guidance are not available because there is 
no formal basis connecting security requirements and policies with the security 
mechanisms that are to fulfill them. What is available is a palette of disjoint 
mechanisms or security countermeasures for implementing individual system 
security features [Loscocco, Smalley, Muckelbauer et al. 1998, Spencer, Smalley, et 
al. 1999] augmented by generalized practices and process standards, such as:  
• mandatory access control lists;  
• firewalls;  
• multi-level security capability lists;  
• authentication (certificate authorities, passwords, etc.);  
• cryptographic support (e.g. public key certificates);  
• encapsulation (including virtualization and hidden rather than public APIs), 
hardware confinement (memory, storage, port, and external device isolation) 
[Sun, Wang et al. 1999], and type enforcement capabilities;  
• data content or control signal flow logging/auditing;  
• honey-pots and traps;  
• functionally equivalent but diverse multi-variant software executables [Franz 
2010, Salamat, Jackson et al. 2011]; 
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• Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) as user guides for 
configuring the security parameters for applications [DISA 2011] and 
operating systems [Smalley 2012];  
• secure programming practices (secure coding standards, data type and value 
range checking, etc.) [Seacord 2008];  
• standards for development organization processes and practices rather than 
system security policies [ISO/IEC 2005];  
• anti-virus software that routinely search system repositories for known attack 
viruses; 
• deep data traffic monitoring within/between enterprise databases, websites, 
portals, or specified client computers that log all data movements, transfers, 
or updates for secondary analysis, using techniques like machine learning or 
others; 
• standards-based software taggants [Kennedy and Muttik 2011], used by 
software producers that assert a secure, encrypted identity authentication and 
provenance to a baseline software element release/version. 
The reader will note that these mechanisms are software implementation 
choices or software process choices rather than system architectural choices or 
security requirements/policy choices. Between these mechanisms and a workable 
concept of a comprehensive security policy for a system or its substantial 
components is a gap, with no obvious way to bridge it.  
• There is no common framework or conceptual basis with which to integrate 
and evaluate mechanisms in combination. It is unclear how the various 
security mechanisms are related and how one may contribute to or interfere 
with another.  
• Guidance is scant for analysts, architects, and developers who need to 
decide which security mechanism to use where, when, how, and why; and 
also for integrators and administrators who need to decide how to update the 
selection of mechanisms and their configuration within a system as security 
needs and policies evolve.  
No satisfactory framework exists in which they can be assembled in 
hierarchical patterns that can be designed and combined in a system architecture to 
meet specific high-level security policies and requirements.  
We believe there is an opportunity to address security requirements 
challenges throughout a system architecture using computational security licenses, 
licenses whose declared obligations and rights can be formally specified and 
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computationally enforced through automated via executable software programs. 
In our previous work [Alspaugh, Asuncion, Scacchi 2009, Alspaugh, 
Asuncion, Scacchi 2011, Alspaugh and Scacchi 2009, Alspaugh, Scacchi, Asuncion 
2010], we showed how software licenses for the components of a system can be 
used to guide architectural choices and evaluate rights and obligations for the 
system as a whole, even when components are governed by different licenses. 
Using our approach, a system architect can work both down from the top, 
propagating desired license rights for the system down to individual components to 
see what license obligations are required to obtain those rights, and up from the 
bottom, combining license rights and obligations for components and then 
subsystems into the total rights and obligations for the system. In either direction, 
our approach identifies any conflicts and mismatches among licenses in the 
architecture. 
We propose the same approach for security licenses. System architects and 
analysts can select desired security rights, assign an expected security license to 
each subsystem or component, and evaluate interactions between these choices at 
every level from an individual component up to the entire system. Of course 
assigning a security license to a component does not guarantee that the 
component’s developer will make it satisfy its security obligations, any more than 
accepting a component under GPL guarantees that the system’s stakeholders will 
satisfy the GPL IP obligations. But assigning a license (whether security or IP) to 
each component records the assumptions being made about that component and its 
use, and evaluating those licenses in the context of the system’s architecture 
identifies mismatches and conflicts among those assumptions for that architecture’s 
design choices. When the evaluation is automated, as it is in our work [Alspaugh, 
Asuncion, Scacchi 2011], it forms the foundation for design guidance with respect to 
the issues raised by the licenses, and a means for combining the potentially 
dissimilar licenses to evaluate their overall interaction and effect, and thus the 
overall interaction and effect of the security mechanisms that are expected to satisfy 
the obligations and of the security requirements and policies that the rights express.  
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Security Licenses as Smart Contracts for Specifying Software 
Cybersecurity Rights, Obligations and Countermeasures 
In general terms, a security license is analogous to an ordinary software 
license such as GPL (GNU General Public License) [FSF 2007]. Software licenses 
consist of intellectual property (IP) rights granted by the licensor, in exchange for 
corresponding license obligations imposed on the licensee. A license presents the 
rights that are offered, and for each right enumerates the obligations that are 
required in order for that right to be granted. Many of the actions required for the 
obligations are related to the actions allowed by the rights. This is particularly so for 
open-source licenses, for which fulfilling some of the obligations requires parts of the 
rights that are granted. Also particularly for open-source licenses, the obligations 
and rights are framed to take effect in an architectural context, with most obligations 
taking effect with respect to either the component for which rights are granted or 
component(s) determined by the connectors and architectural topology around that 
component. Because software licenses are expressed in natural language, the rights 
and obligations are often presented in an intermingled organization, and much of a 
license may be devoted to defining terms, classes of entities referred to, and 
conditions under which the various provisions take effect. But the conceptual 
structure remains that of a list of rights offered, each in exchange for specific 
obligations.  
Our innovation is to similarly specify components’ security rights and 
obligations, which we can then model, analyze, and support throughout the system’s 
development and evolution, and use to guide its design and instantiation.  
There is no “Securityright Act” analogous to the U.S. Copyright Act [US 2017], 
or Berne Convention [Berne 1979], to define the exclusive security rights of system 
stakeholders. We present these possible security rights and obligations as an 
indication of what sorts of actions might be regulated by security licenses for data 
organized into security compartments and code organized into components. 
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Some Possible Rights within Security Licenses for OA Software System 
Components  
Access Rights 
• The right to read data in compartment T. 
• The right to add data to compartment T. 
• The right to remove data from compartment T.  
• The right to delegate security right R.  
• The right to read the security license of component C.  
Evolutionary Update Rights 
• The right to replace component C with another component D.  
• The right to update component C to newer version C′.  
• The right to revert component C to older version C′.  
• The right to add component C in a specified architectural configuration. 
• The right to update component C in a specified architectural configuration.  
• The right to alter the architectural topology of subcomponent B.  
• The right to alter the architecture of system S.  
• The right to add security mechanism M in a specified configuration. 
• The right to update security mechanism M in a specified configuration. 
• The right to remove security mechanism M from a specified configuration. 
• The right to replace the security license L of component C with another 
security license. 
• The right to update security license L. 
Sample of Security Obligations within Security Licenses for OA Software 
System Components  
Access (Control) Obligations 
• The obligation for user U to verify his/her identity, by password or other 
specified authentication process.  
• The obligation for user U to have been vetted by authority A to exercise 
security right R.  
• The obligation for user U to be delegated a one-time right by authority A to 
exercise security right R.  
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Malicious Software Prevention Obligations 
• The obligation for component C to have been vetted by authority A to 
exercise security right R.  
• The obligation for component C to have been vetted by authority A to be the 
object of security right R.  
• The obligation for each component connected to component C to allow it to 
exercise security right R.  
• The obligation for security license L to meet specified criteria.  
• The obligation for security license L to be approved by authority A.  
Exclusive Security Rights  
If there could be legally defined and protected exclusive security rights, what 
would they be? We nominate the following candidates for discussion:  
• The right of the owner of a copy of a system to replace, update, or revert any 
of its components. 
• The right of the owner of a copy of a system to add or remove components or 
otherwise alter its the architectural topology. 
• The right of the owner of a copy of a system to replace or update the security 
license of the system or any of its components. 
• The right of the owner of a copy of a system to alter its user IO streams or 
ephemeral data. (We envision that persistent data may fall into a different 
category of protected entity.) 
 
As with the exclusive copyright rights, the owner of a right may license all or 
part of it to someone else in exchange for obligations, for example to allow a trusted 
system provider to automatically install certain kinds of updates. 
Overall, cybersecurity requirements or capabilities can be expressed in much 
the same way as IP licenses: using concise, testable formal expressions of 
obligations and rights. We found that rights and obligations sufficed to express all 
the software IP licenses that we examined [Alspaugh, Scacchi, and Kawai 2012]. 
The lists above show example that express security rights and obligations, and in 
ongoing work (Scacchi and Alspaugh 2017c) we present a model of cybersecurity 
threats to support a representative set of security issues in OA ecosystems. We 
envision that during architectural integration security licenses will be created to 
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control how cybersecurity will be supported, as current and future releases of 
components and applications from external producers are integrated. 
OA ecosystems are too complex and fast-changing for a security regime that 
is not automated to the greatest extent possible. Right-obligation licenses are 
automatable, and security licenses can made enactable, for example by smart 
contracts controlling blockchain transactions; in this way, as components evolve and 
are attempted to be integrated into a new release of the system, the security 
licenses can require that appropriate obligations are satisfied as an inseparable part 
of exercising a security right. 
In the process of software evolution of the multitudinous parts of the 
integrated system, security licenses will control which versions are incorporated, 
under whose authority, and when. This integration can take place as part of the 
development process or as part of the management of a consumer’s installed 
software configuration. Security licenses give a flexible, computational, extensible, 
scalable approach to managing ongoing security concerns in a software ecosystem. 
Effectiveness, Manageability, Evolvability of Security Licenses  
Consider the case of the development of an open-architecture (OA) system 
integrating proprietary and open-source components from a variety of producers, 
most of whom do not coordinate their activities and none of whom are controlled by 
the organization producing the OA system. From the point of view of ensuring 
security, this is arguably the worst possible case, but it is an increasingly prevalent 
development model [Alspaugh, Scacchi, Asuncion 2010]. The OA approach gives 
access to a wide selection of complex components of high quality, and allows the 
system to evolve as quickly as its integrators can find appropriate new versions or 
new components and evolve their architecture and shim code to accommodate 
them.  
Since the producers do not coordinate, they are unlikely to use the same 
security approaches, and indeed may not even publish what those approaches are. 
To control security in the resulting system, each component is enclosed in a 
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containment vessel [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013] that isolates the component with a 
hypervisor [Xen 2017] and mediates all communication with the component 
(method/function calls, data streams, etc. ) through shim code that monitors and 
restricts it. 
A typical current-day technique [Luom and Du 2011] for managing security 
measures is to use capability lists to control each component’s access to resources 
such as function calls and data compartments. Each access is delayed briefly while 
the monitor checks the access against the accessing component’s capability list, 
then blocked if the component was not granted the capability to access that 
resource. In our experience, each capability list is a text file listing allowed and/or 
forbidden capabilities, managed manually; new capabilities are typically added to the 
end of the file. As there appears to be no formal model supporting relationships 
among capabilities, interactions between capabilities are also identified and 
managed manually. The text files are detailed, which is a positive aspect, but 
therefore also long and mind-numbingly tedious, so errors inevitably creep in and 
are not noticed. Because a capability list has no hierarchy or recursive structure, 
managing them is not scalable.  
A more sophisticated approach is possible using a declarative policy 
language such as Ponder [Damianou, Dulay, et al. 2001] or an ontology-based 
language such as KAoS [Uszok, Bradshaw, Johnson, et al. 2004] that groups 
capabilities hierarchically, in (KAoS) ontologies or grouped by roles (Ponder). 
However, they have no provision for organizing capabilities by software components, 
combined hierarchically into system architectures, and no obvious connection to law.  
We contrast the use of security licenses. In some ways, the approaches are 
similar, in that our candidate security rights are reminiscent of capabilities, and 
security licenses can also be used to identify and block disallowed operations 
automatically. However, because many of the actions required for the security 
obligations are related by subsumption to those granted by the security rights, and 
many of the obligations are in the context of the component for which corresponding 
rights are being granted, it is possible to automatically calculate the interaction of 
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rights and obligations throughout the immediate neighborhood of each component, 
the subsystem containing the component, and so on recursively on up to the system 
as a whole [Alspaugh, Asuncion, Scacchi 2009].  
Structuring cybersecurity rights, obligations and countermeasure (or 
collectively, cybersecurity policies) as security licenses gives a form that is more 
readily accessible to human readers, and helps convey intention and rationale by 
relating each obligation to the right it contributes toward. Where the security licenses 
assigned to the components in the architecture conflict or misalign, automated 
support can identify the provisions in conflict, locate the conflict to the modules 
involved, and provide explanations showing the architectural chain of effects that led 
up to the conflict [Alspaugh, Asuncion, Scacchi 2011]. Perhaps most importantly, 
such specification of cybersecurity licenses using smart contracts (or domain-
specific languages in which such licenses may be coded) supports automation of the 
analysis of interactions between security measures and of the assessment of the 
system’s overall degree and kind of security as a function of the measures taken for 
each component, group of components, subsystem, and so forth recursively up to 
the system as a whole.  
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Blockchains and Smart Contracts for Installed 
Software Configurations 
How might we utilize blockchains and smart contracts to record, track and 
verify updates to OA software system configurations as they evolve over time while 
transitioning across software supply chains? We examine this question in this 
section. 
Ledgers of installed software configurations 
We envision a new kind of ledger: one that records executable computational 
updates to the specification of the current installed, operational configuration of C2/B 
systems of interest. The executable computational updates are similar to scripts in a 
declarative scripting language, like that used to direct the invocation of utilities on an 
operating system, procedural scripts involved in building (compiling and integrating) 
a targeted software executable, or for customizing the functional display and 
navigation operations within a Web browser. We call the repository in which this 
specification is recorded, the installed software configuration (ISC) ledger. The ISC 
is the counterpart to a packaged software configuration (PSC). The PSC denotes the 
collection of software elements (e.g., the collection of files and related software 
execution scripts that will install an integrated mobile app that is ready to use) 
configured for download and installation  on a target software platform or run-time 
environment. Installing a new PSC into the currently deployed ISC produces an 
updated and evolved ISC. The ISC specification is therefore a kind of technical data 
pertaining to the cybersecurity of an OA software system to be managed, 
tracked/logged, updated, and maintained within an acquisition effort. Such data may 
be readily managed using a database or other repository capable of organizing and 
storing update transactions to a software bill of materials (BOM 2017), but with the 
difference that we need a software BOM for both each PSC to be installed, and also 
the accumulating, evolving ISC. 
The ISC ledger records the transactions that update the software 
applications, including their components, interconnections, interfaces, or licenses for 
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such installed on each machine of interest, such as a desktop PC, smartphone, or 
central computation server within a mission command or enterprise data center. The 
installation is enacted via an installation (update) transaction, which may be enabled 
using an “installation wizard” for a standalone PC application, or a ready-to-install 
packaged software app acquired from an online app store. For each application 
installed, the ledger lists the repository from which the software app or update was 
acquired, the version of the application or update, and some information with which 
to confirm/verify the version, such as the size of that version of the app, meta-data 
about where it resides in storage on the machine, other information, or a 
combination of these. How do we ensure that the repository’s copy is safe, has not 
been unintentionally modified, and has not been attacked or unknowingly 
compromised? How do we ensure that attacks are not falsely recorded in the 
ledger?  
In order for a ledger to be up-to-date, each approved installation must be 
recorded there. How do we ensure this is the case for approved installations? If a 
ledger is up to date, then an auditor can verify the approved installations by 
examining the ISC specification for the machine of interest (e.g., a smartphone or 
laptop PC). Furthermore and most importantly, the blockchain can be queried to 
identify non-approved or non-compliant installations, whether these are apps or 
updates that were innocently installed but not recorded in the ledger, or maliciously 
injected software for some nefarious purpose, and thus such covert updates are not 
recorded in the ledger. In either case, the auditor can then institute for each 
application that does not match the ledger a rollback to a known safe ISC state 
matching what has perviously been verified on the ledger. 
The following issues must be managed appropriately for the ledger scheme to 
succeed.  
• How is it ensured that the origination or destination repository’s copy is 
safe and has not been attacked? This is a separate concern, and one that 
is equally problematic with or without a ledger system. We do not discuss it 
further here, merely noting that it must be ensured for devices to remain 
secure. But in normal operation, the ISC specification has a unique identifier, 
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denoted by the hash code1 value associated with the current system when 
last updated and subject to remote verification by anonymous miners who 
may be unknown to the system integrators.  This hash code may reveal 
whether the ISC specification copy’s hash code matches the one checked 
during audit or subsequent miner verification activities. If the hash code 
values are different, then something has altered the copy, and thus it may be 
rolled back to a prior verified state or ISC specification. 
• How is it ensured that every approved installation or update is recorded 
in the ledger? The ledger system must be integrated with whatever system 
manages installations and updates for the machines in question. We note that 
unapproved installations or updates can be automatically detected and can 
be rolled back or reverted at the next audit point/event, so there will be a 
strong motivation to ensure that desired transactions are recorded. 
• How do we ensure that attacks are not falsely recorded in the ledger? 
Obviously this is a key concern. As discussed below under Transactions, 
changes to the ledger are validated by multiple autonomous parties (miners) 
using several sources of information, and each particular copy of a ledger 
competes with all others for accuracy as part of the blockchain scheme. 
Transactions for installed software configurations 
Each transaction in a ledger records an installation or update of an app on a 
specific machine. How do we ensure that all valid installations or updates are 
presented? Every time a new application is installed, or an existing application is 
updated, the appropriate information is recorded in the ledger. If an application is 
installed or updated without being recorded in the ledger, that installation or update 
is recognized as unverified, and thus rolled back the next time the machine is 
audited. Audits may simply involve checking a hash code value (a long, non-
guessable string of characters that is computationally generated within the 
blockchain system), or a similarly unique software taggant hash code [Kennedy and 
Mutitk 2011] associated with the current ISC specification on the target machine, 
with the corresponding value in the blockchain--this is a simple match-checking 
query that can be performed periodically, or by enterprise policy. When the audit 
reveals a mis-match, then a roll-back may be triggered that reverts the ISC on the 
                                                          
1  A “hash code” is the result of a computation that invokes any hash function that can be used to map 
data of arbitrary size to data of fixed size. The values returned by a hash function are called hash values, 
hash codes, digests, or simply hashes. A cryptographic hash function allows one to easily verify that some 
input data maps to a given hash value, but if the input data is unknown, it is deliberately difficult to 
reconstruct it (or equivalent alternatives) by knowing the stored hash value. (cf. Hash Function, Wikipedia 
2017). 
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machine to a previously trusted ISC, and then remove, deprecate, or flag the 
unverified ISC as suspect, along with distribution of notification to relevant parties of 
such action following enterprise policy. But how do we ensure that only valid 
installations or updates are presented? Transactions that would record an invalid 
installation or update, fraudulently misrepresenting the repository’s version’s size or 
hash or from an untrusted repository, are identified by comparison with the set of 
trusted repositories, with the size and hash information recorded there for the 
installation or update in question and for the data calculated from the destination 
machine afterwards. Accordingly, we are acting to use blockchain techniques as 
intended, but for a new kind of use case, namely that of ISC specification update, 
verification and reconciliation. 
Smart Contracts for installed software configurations 
A smart contract works within the framework of the blockchain ledger and 
transaction system, ensuring that the required obligations for each transaction are 
met before the transaction is enacted, verified, and then recorded in the ledger. 
These obligations are associated with those we have previously identified and 
specified as security requirements for insuring access and update rights encoded in 
a software system’s security license [Alspaugh and Scacchi 2012]. 
An example ledger, transaction, smart contract implementation system 
Ethereum [2017] is being used used to implement smart contracts, 
transactions, and a blockchain ledger. Ethereum is a set of technologies: a general-
purpose programming language, open application program interfaces (APIs), and an 
open transaction/blockchain repository associated with the APIs. Ethereum uses a 
cryptocurrency called ether, and users of Ethereum can transfer money, ownership, 
or control of exchanged resources whose (fungible) value is denominated in the form 
of ether between each other and to contracts to hold in escrow. Online currency 
exchange markets can exist for converting ether to a traditional currency like US 
dollars. Users of Ethereum send transactions to it in order to create contracts, invoke 
existing contracts, and transfer ether. The transactions are public and permanently 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 45 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
recorded in the blockchain, unless access to the blockchain is restricted/private to an 
authorized set of known parties who must be granted permission to access or 
update the blockchain.  
Ethereum is decentralized, with a network of blockchains for which each 
transaction is processed by a number of miners, possibly anonymous actors who 
perform computations on the blockchain that collectively verify the validity of a 
transaction of data/value between the participating parties. These miners are 
mutually-untrusted peers who are paid fees (in ether) for the work of processing 
each transaction and its contract provisions. A miner groups transactions into blocks 
and performs a calculation (or “solves a puzzle”) that takes as inputs the previous 
block in the blockchain and the transactions in the new block. A valid block, one 
whose puzzle has been solved and which meets certain other conditions, can be 
appended to the blockchain. The miner broadcasts the new valid block to the 
network and receives the ether paid for each of the transactions by their originators. 
In this way, Ethereum-based smart contracts are validated by decentralized miners. 
These miners receive payment when contracted transactions they verify are 
successfully appended by consensus to the blockchain. 
A transaction may appear in a number of different blocks, produced by 
different miners and appended to different blockchains. Ethereum pays miners 
somewhat more to append a block to a longer blockchain, which has the effect over 
time of converging the ledger to the blocks and thus transactions that the majority of 
miners agree are valid. 
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Blockchains and Smart Contracts for Managing 
Software Development and Evolution Process 
Transactions 
How might we utilize blockchains and smart contracts to manage software 
development or evolution updates to OA software system configurations over time? 
We examine this question in this section.  
Continuous Software Development and Evolution Processes for Open 
Architecture Software Systems 
 In previous work, we have identified and substantiated seven types of 
software evolution process update transactions, shown in Figure 7 below. We further 
observe that a given software evolution process may entail either (a) one type of 
transaction per update, or (b) multiple concurrent types of updates per transaction. 
This may be due to current-to-evolved transformations where the evolved system 
version of the OA configuration involves the replacement of more than one 
component arising from the availability of a new technology that represents a 
departure from the current system architecture, or that integrates functionally similar 
capabilities through a new mix of components, interfaces and interconnections (e.g., 
when combining multiple widgets into mashups [Endres-Niggemeyer 2013]). The 
purpose may be to reduce software maintenance complexity and extend the 
sustainability of a deployed current (or legacy) system through adoption and 
integration of remote (cloud-based) services that are functionally similar to the 
capabilities formerly available in multiple components. For example, replacing legacy 
office productivity applications (word processor, email, calendar) with browser-based 
remote networked services (Google Docs, Microsoft Office 365), can provide end-
users with functionally-similar processing capabilities, but with fewer application 
components installed on the end-user’s desktop PC system. Furthermore, 
subsequent updates to remote services may by policy be integrated and deployed 
automatically for minor functionally equivalent evolutionary updates (e.g., bug fixes), 
or by deployed only by request or authorization when functionally similar system 
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version updates are made available [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013a, Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2015, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2017]. 
Ledger: what versions of what software components and connectors are 
integrated in what OA configuration topology 
A ledger records and defines through the design-time OA specification, the 
ecosystem in which the OA is evolving [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012]. The OA is 
represented using an architecture description language, and successive ledger 
entries record successive configurations of the OA system as it evolves. The ledger 
as a whole presents the history of the OA’s evolution, and as long as the 
components and connectors remain available from their repositories an instance of 
any stage of the OA can be rebuilt as needed. At a minimum the ledger records 
every release of the OA system.  
 
 
Figure 7: Seven types of software evolution update transactions [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2017a]. 
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If a machine on which the OA ISC is installed needs to be rolled back to an 
earlier configuration, the desired version of the ISC can be rebuilt guided by the 
corresponding ledger entry. 
Transactions: OA evolution steps 
Each transaction corresponds to one (or several) of the seven types of OA 
evolution, stating which component, connector, or license is being changed or what 
change is being made to the OA topology. In total, the sequence of all transactions 
for an OA system represents the history of its evolution. The ledger summarizes the 
system’s evolution, based on the transactions made to it, and presents each of the 
versions that the evolution has proceeded through. 
Not everyone can record a transaction with the ledger, and each actor that 
can record a transaction may be restricted in precisely what sorts of transactions can 
be recorded. These restrictions ensure that the OA ISC is evolved through steps that 
preserve its security. It also accommodates actors who may or not have been vetted 
and authorized, so that they are trusted to preserve the system’s security through 
their transactions. 
Smart Contracts: enforcing obligations for each OA evolution step 
Smart contracts restrict the transactions that may occur to those believed to 
preserve the OA system’s security as the system evolves. A transaction may only be 
enacted if the actor doing so has been vetted and authorized for it, and has 
presented credentials identifying himself appropriately; and also only if the current 
state of the OA system development and the evolution step(s) proposed meet the 
conditions imposed by a smart contract associated with the ledger. The smart 
contract in essence states obligations that the actor, the evolution step, and the OA 
system must meet in order for the transaction to occur; if the obligations are not met, 
then the transaction cannot be performed, at least not with this smart contract. The 
obligations declared in a smart contract indicate which parties or actors can 
access/update what OA system elements or other technical data arising during 
software development or evolution processes. As before, these process obligations 
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are similar to those previously identified for controlling software system/data usage 
obligations, along the rights to access and update the system/data provided to 
developer, system integrators, or end-users  [Alspaugh and Scacchi 2012]. 
It is possible that more than one smart contract may potentially allow a 
specific transaction, each contract presenting a different set of obligations. But in 
any case the transaction cannot proceed until a smart contract for the ledger allows 
it to do so. 
To help make clear what we are looking to accomplish through our efforts to 
stimulate innovation in securing the development and evolution of OA software 
systems, we now turn to present a case study focusing on updating the installed 
software configuration of a deployed current OA C2/B software system. 
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Case Study: OA C2/B Software System Evolution 
Process Updates 
In this case study, we describe how blockchains and smart contracts can be 
employed to model and analyze cybersecurity requirements for OA software 
systems that arise during software evolution processes. As described above, there 
are seven types of software evolution process updates that take a current system, 
transform it one of the seven ways, which produces an evolved system. This 
evolution process iteratively cycles through software development processes that 
build, release, and deploy [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b, Scacchi and Alspaugh 
2017] installed software configurations once the development life cycle starts. The 
process continues to (slowly) cycle over time, until the system is retired or 
abandoned. Our focus further narrows to evolving OA C2/B systems that incorporate 
multiple end-user computing platforms, such as smartphones, tablets, or other Web-
compatible “edge” devices [Zheng and Carter 2015], as we have addressed before 
[Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016]. 
Blockchain ledgers serve to verify in a decentralized manner the proper 
sequencing of valid transactions to user/device account. Such an account operates 
like a personal bank account that can be used to deposit and withdraw funds, for 
example, through use of account transactions associated with debit/credit card 
bound to the account. The enterprise that manages accounts for users may charge a 
fee for account transactions, though such fees may be assigned to a third-party 
(e.g., party who receives a payment via a card that has been authorized to possess 
sufficient funds balance to cover the payment in the future). The current “balance of 
funds” in a software evolution process account indicates the name, size, and other 
meta-data that identify executable software applications (including mobile apps, 
plug-in widgets, or other installed software). At present, computing platforms or 
devices do not maintain software process transaction accounts, but in our scheme 
they would.  
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Next, the blockchain ledger as a decentralized database would be distributed 
across a (virtual private) network of computing systems, such as those with 
restricted, authenticated access to a centralized C2/B system host/sub-network. 
Said differently, if we have smartphones or mobile/laptop PCs that can roam in the 
wild, and intentionally or unintentionally acquire software updates (e.g., known app 
updates but with revised access rights; new social media apps; or cyber-penetration 
attack vectors via misdirected access to a remote server), we want all such 
evolutionary software update transactions to be reconciled and validated against a 
the corresponding virtual private network’s blockchain ledger in ways that maintain 
device/user autonomy, but reveals and can reject unvalidated evolutionary updates. 
The ways and means for how valid or invalid transactions are revealed (externally 
documented on the blockchain) or rejected (e.g., enforced automated uninstallation, 
external network access blocked, or notify user of problematic update) are 
determined by enterprise cybersecurity policies encoded into an associated smart 
contract (a functional software program logically isolated from end-user application 
software).  
Let us consider the following usage scenario. Suppose we have a mission 
platform like a ground-based command post (or remote enterprise business office) 
assigned to operate within an international location. Such a location may be in a 
region known to have a history of prior cybersecurity attacks on personal computers, 
mobile, or Web-based devices that access the public Internet. Mission personnel are 
restricted by policy from using their enterprise mobile devices outside the 
cybersecurity perimeter of the mission platform. However, personnel may also 
possess and use private personal devices, such as low-cost smartphones that are 
used for non-mission purposes.  
As anyone who possesses and routinely uses a mobile/edge device like a 
smartphone or laptop PC now frequently experiences, software (evolution) updates 
are common, sometimes one or more per week across the 30-60+ apps found on 
such devices. Sometimes mistakes are made by personnel regarding which device 
to use for accessing remote services like making phone calls to home, to informally 
coordinate with friends in allied forces, to check for local restaurants offering 
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interesting local cuisines, or to post data for sharing on social media. Access control 
to some devices may be misconfigured due to a prior update or unintentionally left 
open in an discoverable device pairing mode, so that other unknown devices or 
remote computers can quietly/covertly make network connections that enable 
data/files upload, download or remote control. Mobile or web-based edge devices 
will be relentlessly targeted for cyber attack, so when a cyber attack vulnerability is 
in the hands of opposing forces or hostile competitors, we assume they will seek out 
and attack these vulnerabilities at some time and place. It is therefore these invalid 
software evolution updates to installed software configurations that denote potential 
cyber attacks that we seek to detect, isolate, trace, expunge or prevent, using the 
capabilities of blockchains and smart contracts. In this way, our use of blockchains 
and smart contracts is innovative, original, and not previously associated with 
software evolution process transactions. 
Consider a desktop PC with apps/widgets acquired from either a restricted-
access enterprise-specific app store, a Defense app store [George, Galdorisi, 
Morris, O'Neil 2014, George, Morris, O'Neil 2014], or else from a public-access app 
store or OSS component repository. A sample picture of such an ISC appears in 
Figure 8. This ISC includes web browser-based apps like cloud-based word 
processors, calendars, and email app services are frequently included in such 
stores. However, open access app stores like those operated by Apple, Google, 
Microsoft and others also offer free/low-cost apps that offer many other remote, 
cloud-based services. In either situation, these remote service apps may operate 
downloaded software code that runs within a platform-based Web browser that 
accesses public or (virtual) private networks. Enterprise end-users with computer 
programming expertise may even create and integrate multiple apps/widgets into 
mashups as a kind of end-user software evolution process update [Endres-
Niggemeyer 2013, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015]. These mashups may enable the 
participating apps/widgets to interoperate, exchange or update local data, or transfer 
data/files to/from remote networked repositories [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016]. 
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Figure 8. A sample view of a desktop PC within a C2/B installed software configuration supporting 
multiple OA software system components or apps from an online store. 
Next, the desktop PC system may itself by part of a larger integrated OA C2/B 
system configured to operate within a local area network, connected to a wide-area 
network supporting remote communications to other command or field operations 
centers. An example of a such system integration is shown in Figure 9. 
  
Figure 9. A view of an integrated OA C2/B system configured to operate as a Future Command 
Center. 
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If our mobile device is a laptop PC, its current (or legacy) OA software 
configuration may include open source software (OSS) or proprietary closed source 
software (CSS) versions of a common Web browser, word processor, email, 
calendar, and more hosted on the PC’s operating system. For instance, a laptop 
may have a Firefox web browser (OSS), AbiWord (OSS) or Microsoft Word (CSS) 
word processor, Gnome Evolution (fOSS) or Outlook (CSS) for email and 
calendaring, and host PC operating like a Fedora/Linux distribution (OSS), Microsoft 
Windows (CSS), or Apple OSX (CSS and OSS). The deployed, run-time executable 
version of this OA ISC system on the laptop PC may appear to an end-user as an 
array of loosely-coupled applications, such as displayed in Figure 10 below. Now, 
suppose a decision has been made to update this OA ISC system, to evolve it from 
the current configuration to one where the word processor, email and calendaring 
applications hosted on the laptop PC are to be replaced with functionally similarly 
remote Web services that will operate within the existing Web browser. These 
remote services thus entail reliance and usage of browser-based software 
components that are hosted in the cloud and downloaded on user demand. This 
transition can simplify and reduce the costs of corresponding software update 
services associated with locally hosted applications (e.g., recurring license fees for 
CSS elements). The resulting deployed and evolved laptop PC software system may 
appear to the end-user as shown in Figure 13 below. 
Each type of software evolution process update can have a smart contract 
associated with it. Each such contract programmatically specifies what 
computational actions need to be performed to complete the transaction with the 
affected technical data and associated data repositories, and similarly what actions 
need to be performed on the blockchain. Let us consider the following transformation 
of a current ISC shown in Figure 10 to an evolved ISC seen in Figure 13. Figure 10 
corresponds to its ISC model visualized in Figure 11, which is derived from its 
specification in an architectural description language (ADL), as we have established 
before [Alspaugh, Asuncion, Scacchi 2013a, Alspaugh, Scacchi, Asuncion 2010]. As 
the current system, we assume for this moment, that it has previously been 
submitted via an earlier transaction on the blockchain that was verified by miners 
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and thus is now a recorded part of the blockchain. Thus we can determine the 
provenance of the current ISC system and its specification. This blockchain contains 
a record of the ISC specification and the results (e.g., blockchain hash code values) 
that the miners computed and agreed by anonymous vote to denote the ISC 
installed and operational on the target machine/platform. The transformation from 
this current system to the evolved system thus entails enaction of the associated 
smart contracts associated with a set of embedded evolution update transactions 
that collectively denote what updates must be verified as a block for the evolved ISC 
specification to be appended to the blockchain. 
 
Figure 10: Current deployed OA C2/B ISC corresponding to Figure 11, utilized by end-users: Firefox 
Web browser (upper left), Evolution calendar (lower-left), AbiWord word processor (upper right), 
Fedora/Linux desktop operating system platform (lower right). 
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Figure 11: The current ISC specification for an OA C2/B system within security containers at build-
time [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b], intended to denote a record on the blockchain for which 
components need to be included during integration (and testing) of the software components and 
code APIs within the released and deployed ISC. 
 
Figure 12: The evolved OA C2/B ISC specification at build-time. Note how the topology of the ISC 
has evolved, including where now legacy components have been deprecated. 
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For example, we may elect to use a pre-defined smart contract (an 
executable software script) whose transactions transform a component-based C2/B 
system with a Web browser installed, into a remote service-based C2/B system, 
where Web/cloud-based services provide functionally similar capabilities to end-
users. This might entail a smart contract that performs the following transactions 
(described in English for simplicity): (1) check the ISC blockchain hash code value(s) 
match those for the current system, if matching, then proceed; (2) deprecate and 
replace designated software application components with remote service 
apps/widgets; (3) replace deprecated component licenses with remote services 
licenses (e.g, ToS); and (4) replace ISC interconnection topology with the evolved 
ISC; (5) send request to miners to independently compute and verify the evolved 
ISC specification hash code value on the target machine/platform denotes the ISC 
and associated meta-data they independently build to compute the evolved ISC 
hash code; (6) if miners vote independently verifies the ISC specification, then assert 
into the blockchain the evolved ISC specification value as denoting the new current 
ISC ready for use; (e) end of contract transactions. Many low-level details are not 
described here, but would need to be in a smart contract. These details can include, 
for instance, the installation parameter settings that are selected or configured by 
either the end-user or installation script, in line with a security technical 
implementation guide (STIG) for the targeted machine/platform.  
The software evolution conveyed in the smart contract example will change 
the topological configuration of software components found in the system integration 
build specification, release, and deployed run-time architectures. Here we see that in 
Figure 12, the configuration model of the evolved OA system still incorporates the 
same kind of components as the current system model (shown above in Figure 11), 
but now the topology of components interconnections and interfaces has been 
updated to realize the deployed, run-time desktop software. Last, a transformation 
from the current software components with their respective licenses, to the evolved 
configuration will also entail an update to new licenses (e.g., Google Terms of 
Service), and how these components will be secured (from end-user level assurance 
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of locally installed components to end-user agreement with remotely provided 
component security that is mostly invisible to end-users).  
 
 
Figure 13: Evolved OA C2/B ISC corresponding to Figure 12, installed for utilization by end-users: 
Firefox Web browser as before, Google Calendar (lower left), Google Docs (upper right), and 
Fedora/Linux operating system platform as before. 
The transformation of the current system in Figure 10 and Figure 11 to the 
evolved system in Figure 12 and Figure 13 entails multiple types of software system 
evolution updates. But now we must consider whether and how such evolution 
process transactions potentially allow for introduction of cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
or attack vectors. This can happen, for instance, in the following ways. If the current 
system is trusted, because its components have individually had their security tested 
for known vulnerabilities and have passed assurance checks, then evolution process 
update transactions may introduce unintended vulnerabilities, either within the 
components replaced, within the new topological configuration, via shifts in the 
obligations or rights (added, subtracted, revised) in the new components, or via the 
overall incorporation of all of these evolutionary updates. So we need to assure the 
security of the update transactions acquired from the component producers and from 
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the system integrators. This entails identifying and validating the software supply 
network that provides the software components that are included in a new PSC for 
installation, or as currently configured within a deployed ISC, as suggested in Figure 
14. Similarly, when a planned and authorized PSC is to be installed into the evolving 
ISC, its software supply network that supplies the new PSC for installation and 
evolutionary update of the current ISC, then its network must also be recognized and 
validated as the source for the updated OA software system components. A similar 
example appears in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 14. A software supply network for the ISC in Figure 10 and Figure 11. 
As these transactions entail request-response transactions with remote 
parties across a network, then they may be vulnerable to “man-in-the-middle” 
attacks, as well as to mistakes made in selecting the appropriate component 
versions for the specific edge device platform. So we want these transactions to be 
coordinated and tracked using blockchains and smart contracts, so that we can 
better trust the security of the evolution process updates. Said differently, we want 
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any and all updates that affect the OA software system components, 
interconnections and interfaces, or licenses to be mediated and verified by remote 
parties via blockchain transactions. This entails that each edge device or system 
platform must be able to periodically (e.g., daily, after an application program exits, 
or by mission-specific policy) identify itself and assert the “value” of its current ISC 
elements and configuration specification, in a way that can be reconciled against the 
last known, corresponding verified values on the blockchain. If a discrepancy 
between the value of the last known (and trusted) current system configuration, and 
the system evolved configuration is detected, then some unknown evolution update 
has occurred, such that system security is now unknown and may no longer be 
trusted. Such a condition may then produce a notification of such discrepancy, 
automatically revert to the last known trusted current system, or some other 
intervention action, depending on the evolution process update security policies 
expressed in the corresponding smart contract. Subsequently, we now have new 
ways and means for assuring, detecting, or preventing authorized/unauthorized 
evolutionary changes to an OA ISC during the software development and evolution 
processes which occur routinely during a system acquisition effort. 
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Figure 15. The alternative software supply chain given rise to the evolved ISC in Figure 12 and 
Figure 13. 
 
Overall, the purpose of this case study is to help describe and reveal that 
common and widespread acquisition processes associated with the development, 
usage, or evolution of OA software systems supporting C2/B mission applications is 
not necessarily secure, and thus can allow for unknown or poorly understood 
evolutionary updates that are intended or not. Our efforts begin to characterize the 
need to continuously secure and assure these software engineering process 
updates and their provenance. Such continuous assurance capabilities are needed 
in addition to other techniques that focus on assuring the security and integrity of the 
individual software components acquired from diverse producers or integrators 
through software ecosystems that release deployable run-time software applications 
or remote services. 
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Discussion 
There are three topics we find merit consideration, given what now appears 
possible in the use of blockchains and smart contracts as mechanisms for assuring 
software development and evolution process update transactions for OA C2/B 
systems. These are (a) how cyberattacks that may potentially arise in traditional 
software engineering processes can now be prevented, detected or marked for 
action; (b) innovations in acquisition research that may follow; and (c) future 
extensions of this line of research and study. 
Cyberattacks on software evolution, release, and update processes  
The types of software evolution updates in Figure 7 also classify comparable 
types of software supply chain threats/attacks on OA systems during software 
system development, build, deployment, and run-time processes [Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2013a, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013b, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2013c, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2017a, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2017b]. The difference being 
that cyberattacks on software denote unauthorized or unverified updates from the 
current ISC during design-time, build-time and deployment-time software 
engineering activities, to an evolved ISC. This implies that covert software evolution 
changes by an attacker may follow the same steps as those by a trusted software 
producer or system integrator; namely replacement of a component by a newer 
version or by a different component, access to a component through a different 
interface, replacement of a connector, or replacement of the topological 
configuration. (We are presently unaware of attacks involving replacement of a 
component license, but such attacks that change/rewrite IP or security license 
obligations and rights [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2012, Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015, 
Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016] are clearly possible.) The result is a compromised 
version of the system that is functionally similar to the current (trusted) ISC system, 
but masquerading as one that is authorized, validated, and functionally equivalent 
intended not to be recognized as something different. 
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When the attack is made on a deployed instance of the ISC system, its 
presence can be identified by the change in the size or hash code value of the 
compromised system, compared to the current system’s provenance or software 
taggant values already established and validated in the blockchain. The window of 
time during which the attacked system may take effect is limited by the frequency 
with which the edge device’s software is compared with what the blockchain ledger 
recorded as being installed, as after any change is discovered the edge system’s 
software can be rolled back to its (prior, now current) trusted configuration. 
The process is more complex for intentional but covert attacks during 
development, build, and deployment, because the context is more complex, as 
indicated in our examination of recent social and technical threats/attacks software 
supply chain identified earlier in this report. Specifically, we wish to prevent insecure 
components, connectors, and configurations from being incorporated into the OA 
system; but an OA system is by its nature typically the result of a distributed, 
decentralized development, with components coming from other projects and 
developed and evolved by parties distant and often unknown to the OA system’s 
integrators. We foresee the use of blockchains for PSC/ISC update transactions that 
are subject to smart contracts within DAO software supply networks to record each 
component and connector’s provenance, vetting, and authorization. Smart contracts 
restrict the possible transactions (evolution steps) to those believed to preserve the 
OA system’s security. When an unexpected change is discovered in an edge device 
system’s software, it is rolled back to a safe version; when a security fault is 
discovered in a version of the system, a process that may be much more involved, 
the components, connectors, and topology involved may be rolled back to a trusted 
safe version, and the smart contracts through which the fault was introduced may be 
updated to prevent a “similar” evolution in the future. This may be done either by 
withdrawing authorization from actors involved, by blacklisting a component 
repository whose vetting was careless, or by similar means. The blockchain ledger 
records the information needed to take such steps. 
This points to two further areas of research. First, the blockchain ledger 
system now becomes a locus against which attackers will wish to operate, and 
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further study is needed to examine how to resist such attacks, isolate their effect, 
and to the extent possible reject them through the blockchain and transaction 
mechanism itself. Second, can the ledger be used as a database of information for 
effectively distinguishing fraudulent or corrupted evolution steps? Further research 
will be necessary.  
The only allowed OA evolution updates of the secure system are those that 
are first verified as valid updates, from known trusted parties, and that satisfy a 
contract for the blockchain ledger. In cases where a vulnerable or corrupted 
component, connector, or topology successfully runs this gauntlet, the ledger 
provides a means for rolling back transactions to a secure version of the system that 
can be deployed in place of the insecure later version. 
We note that in contrast to a procedural programming language such as the 
Solidity language used for Ethereum contracts, a declarative scripting language 
mitigates against recently discovered vulnerabilities of smart contract technologies 
such as those found for the Ethereum run-time interpreter [Atzei, Bartoletti, Cimoli 
2016]. 
Innovation for Acquisition Research 
The work prior to this paper in software cybersecurity is primarily focused on 
making a particular version of the software system itself, as a product, secure. In this 
paper, we are expanding our view to include the ecosystem within which the system 
evolves, the software architecture specification that defines and constrains that 
ecosystem, the evolution of the components and connectors that are integrated into 
the system, and the OA evolution process by which any OA system evolves from 
version to version. To this, we are adding the ability to record, track, verify, and 
maintain the security of the OA system throughout its development and evolution 
processes. 
We are proposing the use of blockchains and smart contracts to assure the 
security of software engineering process update transactions. We are not at this time 
investigating how blockchains and smart contracts may be used as potential 
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mechanisms that support the financial transactions or new business models for 
purchasing the services or products associated with a OA software system 
acquisition [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2016]. That is a topic for future research. 
Similarly, though blockchains and smart contracts are relatively new, they also entail 
their own set of vulnerabilities associated with their different technological 
implementations [Atzei, Bartoletti, Cimoli 2016] that must be addressed. Whether or 
how such vulnerabilities may manifest within acquisition processes is also a topic for 
future research. 
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Recommendations: Future extensions and new 
research elaborations 
We have discussed the application of a blockchain system for coordinating 
and steering the evolution of an OA software system that is produced or integrated 
by a single party. But a blockchain system is by its nature a distributed system, and 
though its distributedness does not in itself give extra benefit in multi-producer, multi-
integrator software ecosystems, clearly it is as effective in recording evolution and 
provenance in them, and is already adapted to the challenges of interactions with 
many parties. 
Future research topic – cybersecurity threat meta-model formalization 
and codification 
First, the social and technical threats and unintentional acts indicated earlier 
in Section 2.3 can form a basis for an OA software cybersecurity threat meta-model, 
based on the kinds of threats presented earlier in the examination of social, technical 
and unintentional threats to software supply chains. Here we summarize the outline 
of such a meta-model based on a comparative analysis of the three kinds of threats 
identified across more than kinds of identified software supply chain threats: threats 
of unauthorized access, threats of denial of authorized access, and threats of 
malicious software. 
– Recognizing and Preventing Unauthorized Access Opportunities 
These threats can enable the release, exposure, or exfiltration of data, user 
guides, software products, security access control mechanisms such as keys and 
licenses, and other secret or restricted information. The release may be intentional 
or unintentional, and may involve bribery, identity spoofing, hacks, man-in-the-
middle attacks, updates, backups, and other technical or non-technical means. 
OA software cybersecurity threat meta-model construction (unauthorized 
access): 
disclosure/granted-access to unauthorized people of:  
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• information (secret; security weakness)  
• user guides  
• software products 
 permission to use; modify; redistribute 
o Note, these can result from IP/Security License evolution updates 
• data storage (facility; repository; media) 
• security access control mechanisms (keys; lists; containers; virtual machines; 
licenses) 
intentionally or unintentionally, because of:  
• non-technical reasons  
 delivery mistake or repudiation 
 bribery (coerced actors) 
 identity spoofing 
• technical reasons (“evolution update transactions”) 
 hacking (unauthorized updates) 
 insertion of malicious code 
 man-in-the-middle delivery interception attack 
 denial of service attack 
 deletion/destruction 
 modification or destruction of security mechanisms or capabilities 
o data access control, backup, and transfer 
o software update access control and transfer 
 
– Recognizing and Preventing Opportunities for Denial of Authorized User 
Access 
These threats involve all the aspects of unauthorized access threats, but 
invert their perspectives by denying access to the same sorts of information and 
control to authorized people.  
OA software cybersecurity threat meta-model construction (denied authorized 
access): 
non-disclosure/denied-access to authorized people of:  
• information (secret; security weakness)  
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• user guides 
• software products 
 unable to use; modify; redistribute 
o Note, these can result from IP/Security License evolution updates 
• data storage (facility; repository; media) 
• security access control mechanisms (keys (exceed local legal limit); (lists; 
containers; virtual machines (modified/destroyed)); licenses) 
• software product delivery/acceptance confirmation receipts 
intentionally or unintentionally of because of:  
• non-technical reasons  
 delivery mistake or repudiation 
 bribery (coerced actors) 
 identity spoofing 
• technical reasons (“evolution update transactions”) 
 hacking (unauthorized updates) 
 insertion of malicious code 
 man-in-the-middle delivery interception-modification attack 
 denial of service attack 
 deletion/destruction 
 modification or destruction of security mechanisms or capabilities 
o data access control, backup, and transfer 
o software update access control and transfer 
 
– Recognizing and Preventing Opportunities for Introduction of Malicious 
Software 
The final category of threats involve malicious software elements including 
source code, externally sourced components, libraries and middleware, software 
connectors such as APIs and protocol handlers, build and packaging scripts, 
operating system protection mechanisms, storage devices and removable media, 
and corrupted or counterfeit data. They may be accomplished through the same 
technical and non-technical means as the first two categories of threats, and involve 
introduction, modification, or deletion of the elements in question.  
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OA software cybersecurity threat meta-model construction (introduction of malicious 
software): 
disclosure/access to authorized people of  
• malicious/corrupted software elements (counterfeit; unauthorized-modified 
(malicious code insertion)) via infection site: 
 application source code 
 outsourced or open source software components 
o standalone software systems (executable binaries; source code) 
o apps 
o widgets 
o build/packaging scripts 
o mashups 
 software libraries/middleware 
 software connectors 
o application program interfaces (APIs) 
o operating system/utility scripting 
o protocol handlers 
o database management systems 
o storage repositories  
 application (files; file systems) 
 software source/binary code (files; file systems (e.g., GitHub; 
SourceForge)) 
o software buses 
 software containers 
o common software installation packages  
 Note, this also applies to compliance/validation testing 
software/data sets  
o packed (compressed), encrypted code for installation, unpacking and 
execution in computer memory 
o operating system protection mechanisms/capabilities (e.g., SELinux, 
SEAndroid-- security enhanced Linux, Android, from NSA) 
o virtual machines 
o storage devices 
o removable media 
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 corrupted/malicious licenses (IP/Security)  
o can also allow for corrupted/counterfeit data (facility; repository; media) 
elements 
intentionally or unintentionally because of:  
• technical reasons (“evolution update transactions”) 
 hacking (unauthorized updates) 
 insertion of malicious code 
 man-in-the-middle delivery interception or hijacking attack 
 denial of service attack 
 deletion/destruction 
 modification or destruction of security mechanisms or capabilities 
o data access control, backup, and transfer 
o software update access control and transfer 
 
Future research topic – formalizing a domain-specific language and 
processing environment for specifying cybersecurity threat models and 
defensive security licenses as enactable smart contracts 
In our prior research, we have called for a declarative domain-specific 
language (DSL) for specifying the obligations and rights incorporated into IP and 
security licenses for OA software [Alspaugh and Scacchi 2012, Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2013a]. Now we see that such a DSL can be extended to incorporate 
software engineering process transactions using process modeling language like 
PML [Noll and Scacchi 2001, Scacchi 2001] or a similar notation, and that such 
extension is advantageous for managing OA software security system and 
engineering process challenges. The design and incorporation of these extensions 
into the DSL is thus a next step for us to research, develop and refine. 
Next, we have also called for research and development of software 
obligations and rights management systems (SORMS) as a core capability for the 
DoD, government agencies, and other enterprises to help manage and improve their 
OA software system buying power [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2015, Scacchi and 
Alspaugh 2016]. We envision a SORMS that interprets and evaluates DSLs for 
software licensing as an essential tool for enterprises that manage OA software 
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systems, such as found in most large organizations in industry, government, and 
Defense. Such DSL interpretation and execution will manipulate transactions to 
software bill of materials (BOM) technical data for the accumulating and evolving 
ISC, as well as for each PSC that is to be added/integrated via OA system evolution 
updates. Such transactions are intended to be subject to the rights, obligations, and 
countermeasures stipulated in OA software system licenses that conform to new 
cybersecurity meta-models outlined above. 
As noted earlier, unauthorized updates to an ISC, whether the result of a 
social, technical or unintentional software supply chain threat, would be detected 
and defended against by the design of the SORMS that interprets system security 
licenses as smart contracts. These computational contracts would need to run 
continuously whenever a OA software system is being used in normal operations, as 
well as when the system is being intentionally updated. Such an approach is similar 
to the operation of any remote network/web server with a database management 
back-end server that normally operates continuously by design. The computational 
burden for such server operations is anticipated to be very modest, since the 
continuous computations are primarily checking ISC hash code values posted and 
maintained in the software BOM repository associated with the ISC. If/when 
intentional PSC updates are planned and executed, then remote validation of before 
and after ISC hash code functions reveal either accepted matches (thus valid 
update) or otherwise unaccepted or mismatch (indicating invalid update, thus the 
PSC is not installed, or the current ISC is marked as suspect, and identified as a 
candidate to be rolled back to a known valid ISC, perhaps indicating an unauthorized 
ISC update).  
Thus, we call for effort to add capabilities that extend the SORMS to 
accommodate blockchain ledgers that manage and store software BOM repositories 
for both PSC to be installed and for accumulating and evolving ISCs, as 
decentralized or centralized databases, on which are enacted security licenses as 
smart contracts for automated handling software development and evolution process 
update transactions.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 73 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Conclusions 
We sought to stimulate the development of innovative approaches to 
continuously assuring the cybersecurity of Open Architecture (OA) software system. 
We focused attention to exploring the potential for using blockchains and smart 
contract techniques, and how they can be applied to support acquisition efforts for 
software systems for OA command and control, or business enterprise (C2/B) 
systems. We further limited our focus to examining the routine software system 
updates to OA software configuration specifications that arise during the 
development and evolution processes arising during system acquisition. Our efforts 
described through our case study and related efforts thus denote a promising line of 
work in progress.  
Much remains to be done, but the direction forward appears robust, 
productive, and likely to stimulate new innovations as a result of future research 
opportunities that we have recommended. We welcome questions and comments 
that identify possible oversights, as well as suggest complementary capabilities that 
enhance the potential of blockchain and smart contract tools, techniques, and 
technologies for continuously assuring the cybersecurity of software supply chains 
that support the development and evolution of modular, open architecture software 
systems as installed software configurations. 
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